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Abstract. Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant)
goals, set by a manager, on a team of workers with “weak-link” production technology.
Can nonbinding goals improve team production when team members face production
complementarity? Academic/practical relevance:Nonbinding goals are easy to implement
and ubiquitous in practice. These goals have been shown to improve individual perfor-
mance, but it remains to be seen if such goals are effective in team production when there is
production complementarity among workers.Methodology:We first develop a theoretical
model where goals act as reference points for workers’ intrinsic motivation to complete
the task. We then test our hypotheses in a controlled, human-subjects experiment. In our
experiment, participants act as managers or workers, and we examine the impact of
nonbinding goals on team outcomes.Results:Consistent with ourmodel, we find evidence
that team production does increase when managers are able to set goals. This effect is
strongest when goals are challenging but attainable for weak-link workers. However, we
also find evidence that many managers assign goals that are too challenging for weak-link
workers, resulting in suboptimal team production, lower profits, and higher wasted
performance (performance above the weak-link level). Managerial implications: Our
analysis indicates that goals are effective motivators in teams, but some managers may
have difficulty overcoming personal biases when setting goals. The task of setting team
goals is more complex than setting individual goals, and many managers can benefit from
training on how to set good goals for the team. Moreover, our finding that suboptimal
goals also increase wasted performance suggests that improving goal-setting strategies is
especially important in production settings where overperformance is costly for the firm
(scrap, energy use, inventory costs, lower prices as a result of oversupply, etc.).
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Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0793.
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1. Introduction
Setting a goal that does not directly impact a worker’s
earnings is a ubiquitous motivational tool; a manager
may have an informal celebration if an early deadline
is met, send a congratulatory message when the proj-
ect is completed, or keep a running tally of the number
of dayswith noworkplace accidents to encourage safety.
Under standard utility theory, these goals, commonly
called nonbinding goals, should have no impact on out-
put, and hence, managers should not use them to mo-
tivate workers. However, nonbinding goals are seen
everywhere in practice, and evidence frompsychology
(Deci 1971, Frey and Jegen 2001, Kamenica 2012) and
managerial economics (Heath et al. 1999; Goerg and
Kube 2012; Gómez-Miñambres 2012; Corgnet et al.
2015, 2018) shows that nonbinding goals can be very
effective motivators. Typically, a nonbinding goal can
increase individual performance by 10%–30% in human-
subject experiments. Furthermore, nonbinding goals
are particularly attractive tools for managers because
these goals are costless to implement. There is lim-
ited research on the impact of goals in teams, especially
in more complex production settings, although evi-
dence fromoperationsmanagement (Doerr et al. 1996,
Linderman et. al 2006) suggests that binding and
nonbinding goals can improve output for pull pro-
duction and Six Sigma teams. Still, it is unclear whether
nonbinding goals will be effective in production set-
tings with complementarities, where team production
depends on all workers exerting effort. For example, in
project management, all team members must meet
the deadline to avoid late delivery. In software de-
velopment, developers code large software suites in
pieces, and all developersmust ensure that their portion
of the code is bug-free before shipping thefinal product.
In these settings, managers may only be able to set one
goal for the whole team because of fairness concerns
or unobservability of individual worker performance.
When managers do not individualize the goal for
each worker, and the production technology depends
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on all workers, it is unclear whether nonbinding goals
are still effective.
Therefore, we look to answer the following ques-
tions: (1) Can nonbinding goals increase production
in teams? And if so, (2) what goal should managers
set to maximize production? In this paper, we show
that nonbinding goals are powerful enough to mo-
tivate a team of workers to increase production, even
when significant production complementarities ex-
ist. However, managers often set suboptimal goals for
teams. We define a production setting where teams,
consisting of one manager and three workers, must
coordinate to increase team production; team pro-
duction and monetary payoffs for everyone are de-
termined by theminimumperformance of all workers
(i.e., the “weak link”). To capture the effect of non-
monetary incentives on the team, we allow managers
to assign a nonbinding goal for team production. We
use the weak-link production technology as a strong
test for nonbinding goals. If nonbinding goals are ef-
fective in a team setting with the highest degree of
complementarity, these goals should be even more
effective for teams with less complementarity, where
team production also depends on worker perfor-
mance above the minimum.
Our research is motivated by extensive evidence of
team coordination failure in weak-link production
settings, with individual effort rapidly falling to the
minimum level (see Camerer 2003 and Devetag and
Ortmann 2007 for reviews). In particular, we con-
tribute to the literature by studying how nonbinding,
seemingly payoff-irrelevant goals affect team pro-
duction with weak-link technology. From a theoret-
ical standpoint, we modify the standard weak-link
coordination game (Van Huyck et al. 1990) by as-
suming that workers have two sources of motivation:
a standard monetary motivation that depends on the
team production and a nonmonetary motivation that
depends on whether the individual’s performance is
above or below the goal. As a result, a worker’s utility
depends not only on the standard monetary payoffs
and cost of effort but also on whether he or she
achieved the goal. In other words, even if producing
more than the weak link does not entail monetary
rewards, it does provide nonmonetary satisfaction
for workers whose individual performance is above
the goal. We show that when nonbinding goals are
present, two types of workers characterize the solution
of the game: a group of low-abilityworkerswhomatch
what the weak-link worker does and a group of high-
ability workers who choose to produce above the weak-
link level to garner the nonmonetary utility associ-
ated with goal attainment. Importantly, we also show
that tomaximize team production, a managermust set
a goal that it is challenging but attainable for the weak-
link worker and that the optimal goal minimizes high-
ability workers’ wasted performance (performance
above the weak-link level), minimizing the spread of
performance among team members.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to theo-
retically and experimentally examine the impact of
nonbinding goals on team production with weak-link
complementarity. We design a weak-link coordina-
tion game using a real effort laboratory experiment,
and we allow managers to set a nonbinding goal for
team production. We chose to use a laboratory exper-
iment so that we could make causal inferences about
the efficacy of nonbinding goals, as well as measure
and control for heterogeneity in worker ability. Con-
sistent with our predictions, we find that when man-
agers are able to set goals for the team, team production
increases by 19.8% on average, and as our model pre-
dicts, the positive effect of goal setting is especially
strong when goals are challenging but attainable
for the weak-link worker, whose performance deter-
mines team production. However, we also find that
managers do not always set profit-maximizing goals
for the team, indicating that managers may be setting
goals for other reasons. In particular, we find evidence
that managers often disregard the weak-link worker’s
ability, which leads some managers to assign unrea-
sonably difficult goals for the weak-link worker. Finally,
consistent with our theoretical results, we provide evi-
dence that managers who assign unreasonable goals
for the weak link generate not only lower team pro-
duction but also higher wasted performance; this is,
in part, because goals that are too difficult for the
weak link are more motivational for higher-ability
workers.
1.1. Connection to the Literature
Our research sits at the intersection of the goal-setting
and the coordination in teams literature, which are
well-studied topics in psychology, managerial eco-
nomics, and, recently, operations management. In
this section, we highlight the streams of literatures
most relevant to our paper and detail our contribu-
tions. In the goal-setting literature, the motivational
effect of wage-irrelevant goals has been studied at
length in psychology (see Locke and Latham 2002 for
a review). Psychologists have focused on the moti-
vational and cognitive aspects of goals, stressing
that goals should be SMART, an acronym for spe-
cific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-based.
More recently, nonbinding goals have been studied in
managerial economics and proven to be effective
motivators for individual workers (Heath et al. 1999;
Goerg and Kube 2012; Gómez-Miñambres 2012;
Corgnet et al. 2015, 2018; Smithers 2015). Rather than
relying on the monetary consequences of their ac-
tions, the goals considered in this literature appeal to
the intrinsic motivation of workers (Deci 1971, Frey
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and Jegen 2001, Kamenica 2012). Although a grow-
ing number of papers in economics and management
have documented the effectiveness of various forms
of nonmonetary incentives on individual workers,
including performance goals (Wu et al. 2008; Goerg
and Kube 2012; Gómez-Miñambres 2012; Corgnet
et al. 2015, 2018), personal goals in self-control set-
ting (Ainslie 1992, Hsiaw 2013), status incentives
(Charness et al. 2014), symbolic rewards (Kosfeld and
Neckermann 2011), delegation (Fehr et al. 2013), au-
tonomy (Falk and Kosfeld 2006), and trust (Dickinson
and Villeval 2008), little is known about the effec-
tiveness of nonmonetary incentives in teams. Contrary
to the existing literature on goal setting, we focus on a
team environment where the success or failure of a
project relies on the performance of the weakest link.
This is similar to the assembly-line context that Doerr
et al. (1996) study, analyzing the impact of binding
goals under push-versus-pull production policies.
The authors find that these incentives have a positive
impact on output under pull production. Our results
show that nonbinding goals also have a positive effect
on team production. The goals that we consider are
nonbinding and hence cheaper and easier to imple-
ment in practice.
Our research is also motivated by extensive evi-
dence of team coordination failure inweak-link games,
with effort rapidly falling to the minimum level (see
Camerer 2003 and Devetag and Ortmann 2007 for
reviews). The study of weak-link (or minimum ef-
fort) games is common in the economics and opera-
tions literature (Van Huyck et al. 1990, Weber 2006,
Brandts et al. 2011, Hyndman et al. 2014, Shokoohyar
et al. 2017) because these games apply to many dif-
ferent production environments. Almost all of these
studies are abstract effort experiments in the sense that
they use the concept of induced valuation to create
individual cost of effort (Smith 1976); if a subject
selects effort level x, then he or she pays a certain
amount c(x) in experimental earnings. Furthermore,
most of these experiments also induce symmetric
costs of effort across the experimental subjects. These
studies find that with large groups (three or more sub-
jects), coordination outcomes often converge to the least
efficient equilibrium (see Van Huyck et al. 1990, Knez
and Camerer 1994, Brandts et al. 2011). External in-
fluences, such as pregame communication or intergroup
competition, can induce better outcomes (Van Huyck
et al. 1990, Cooper et al. 1992, Bornstein et al. 2002).
Coordination is a growing topic of research in op-
erations management as well, because coordination
failure can arise in team production environments
such as supplier capacity allocation and project man-
agement. For example, Gerchak and Wang (2004)
model how a set of suppliers coordinates when choosing
production quantities to support assembly operations
for a common customer. Argyres (1999) discusses the
difficulty of coordination for the four suppliers of the
B-2 Bomber program and the challenges of on-time
delivery fromaprojectmanagement perspective. From
an experimental point of view, studies have examined
coordination outcomes in two-player newsvendor games
(Hyndman et al. 2014), project management games
where effort accumulates over stages (Shokoohyar
et al. 2017), and group selection games where sub-
jects decide whether to pay a membership fee (Fan
et al. 2018). Again, these studies focus on abstract
effort, whichmay not capture important psychological
effects from the act of working (such as intrinsic mo-
tivation) that can affect coordination outcomes.
Real effort tasks (such as adding rows of numbers
or counting coins) may more closely match actual
team production, where the cost of effort is not sym-
metric among teammembers, and they have the added
challenges that players’ cost functions and the “op-
timal” coordination level are not directly observable.
There are only a few real effort coordination experi-
ments in the literature. The coordination experiment
of Bortolotti et al. (2016) consists of assigning subjects
to teams and having them sort and count coins worth 1,
2, 5, and 10 euro cents within a time limit. The objective
is to minimize the number of counting errors. As in
our experiment, the task is individual, but the payoff
to a team is the minimum of all team members. The
authors find that subjects eventually coordinate at
the efficient level of zero errors from all members. The
second real effort coordination experiment was con-
ducted byVranceanu et al. (2015). The authors use the
task of counting 7’s in a block of random numbers—
correctly reporting the number of 7’s in a block gen-
erates one unit of output. Subjects are paired, and
individual profit is a function of the minimum output
as well as individual breaks taken, thought of as the
opportunity cost of working. Higher-performing indi-
viduals can also punish their lower-performing coun-
terparts. The study finds that team performance is
not lower than individual performance, suggesting
high levels of cooperation in pairs, and that the
ability to sanction does not significantly improve team
production.
The real effort activity in our experiment consists
of a simple yet tedious slider task activity, first used
by Gill and Prowse (2012), where individual effort is
highly correlated with individual performance. In-
stead of relying on peer pressure or exogenously given
goals, we consider the effect of nonbinding goals set
by managers whose payoff depends on the team pro-
duction. Thus, we contribute to the literature by intro-
ducing nonbinding goals as a potential mechanism to
improve coordination for a group of workers facing
high levels of strategic complementarity. Our findings
indicate that (1) nonbinding goals can meaningfully
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improve team production, although the level of the
goal is important, and that (2) real effort coordination
outcomes can significantly differ from abstract effort
coordination outcomes.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce our theoretical framework, and we
model the potential impact of goals on worker per-
formance and team production. Section 3 describes
the experimental environment, procedures, and hy-
potheses. Main results are presented in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
In this section, we develop a model of a weak-link
coordination game where workers have asymmetric
cost functions and intrinsic motivation, and we es-
tablish our experiment hypotheses.
2.1. Setup
In our model, one manager is in charge of a team of
n workers who must complete the project at hand.
The effort of worker i is given by yi ∈R+, and we de-
note by y  [y1, . . . , yn] the vector of possible effort
levels. We assume that a worker’s performance in the
project depends only on his or her exerted effort.
Therefore, we use the terms effort and performance
interchangeably in this paper (although in the online
appendix we consider a model with variability of
performance given the effort). We assume that workers
have a different increasing, twice-differentiable, and
strictly convex cost of effort functions c(y;θi). We
interpret parameter θi as worker i’s ability level, with
θi ∈ [θ, θ̄]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤⋯≤θn, so θ1 is the ability of the weak-link
worker. We abstract away from moral hazard con-
cerns by assuming that ability is common knowledge
to the manager and workers. We further assume that
c(0;θi)  0 for all θi and that
cy (y;θn) ≤ cy (y;θn−1) ≤⋯≤ cy (y;θ1),
where cy (y;θi) is the partial derivative of c (y;θi)with
respect to y.
Team productionM(y) is determined by the lowest
performance of all workers, so M(y)  min (y1, . . . , yn).
For simplicity, we assume that all n workers as well
as the manager receive identical monetary payoffs
based on M (y), so the monetary payoffs are given
by A ·M(y), where A> 0 reflects the profitability of
the team production, and it hence determines the
magnitude of the monetary team incentives. Workers
may also be motivated by nonbinding goals assigned
by the manager. We formalize this effect by consid-
ering a goal-dependent, nonmonetary value function
v (yi − g) that satisfies the following prospect theoretic
properties (Kahneman and Tversky 1979):
1. v(0)  0 (goal as a reference point);
2. v′( · ) > 0 (increase in production given a goal);
3. for all x> 0, −v (−x)  λv(x), where λ> 1 (goal-
induced loss aversion);
4. v′′(x)> 0, for all x < 0 (convexity for goal-
induced losses); and
5. v′′(x)< 0, for all x > 0 (concavity for goal-
induced gains),
where v′( · ) and v′′( · ) denote the first and second de-
rivatives of v ( · ), respectively. Our nonmonetary util-
ity function is motivated by experimental and field
evidence showing that wage-irrelevant goals serve as
reference points in a manner that is consistent with
prospect theory (Heath et al. 1999). Properties 4 and 5
capture a prospect theory principle commonly known
as diminishing sensitivity, the idea that outcomes have
a smaller marginal impact when they are more dis-
tant from the reference point. Diminishing sensitiv-
ity not only gives the value function its characteristic
S shape but also has been found to be the core ex-
planation of the motivational effect of goals as ref-
erence points (Wu et al. 2008). Property 3 captures loss
aversion, the property whereby losses loom larger
than gains. Similar specifications have also been con-
sidered by other authors in economics and manage-
ment literatures (Corgnet et al. 2015, 2018, Dalton
et al. 2016).
A worker’s payoff πwi is the sum of monetary gains
and nonmonetary utility minus the cost of effort:
πwi (yi, y−i, g,A;θi)  A ·M(y) + v(yi − g) − c(yi;θi).
Note that we assume that a worker’s nonmonetary
utility function v (yi − g) is determined by his or her
individual performance relative to the goal. (In the
online appendix, we explore the case where v( · ) de-
pends on the difference between team production and
the goal. We show that the results are equivalent to
when only monetary incentives are present). There-
fore, whereas a worker’s monetary payoff depends
only on the team production (as in the standard weak-
link game), the worker gets an additional nonmonetary
payoff when his or her performance meets or exceeds
the goal. The last effect represents the satisfaction that a
worker gets from his or her individual performance
regardless of team production—in other words, from
doing his or her part of the project.
Finally, we assume that the manager’s payoff πm
depends only on the production of the team project:
πm(A, y)  A ·M(y).
Thus, the manager incurs no cost of effort because he
or she does not participate in production, and his or
her only objective is to maximize team production by
choosing a nonbinding goal g thatmaximizes his or her
monetary payoffs.
We first examine the standard case with no goal-
dependent utility. Then we show the effects of
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including a nonmonetary, goal-dependent utility
function.
2.2. Coordination Game with Only Monetary Payoffs
In the one-stage, asymmetric cost coordination game
with only monetary motivation, a worker’s payoff
function is given by
πwi (A, y, yi)  A ·M (y) − c(yi;θi).
The first-order condition of worker i’s payoff maxi-
mization function is cy (yi;θi) ≤A. The first-order
condition will hold with equality if the agent is the
weak-link worker as well as the only worker pro-
ducing at the minimum, and it will be cy (yi;θi)  0
otherwise (note that when there is more than one
worker producing at the minimum, the profit func-
tions of these workers are kinked in yi). Thus, when
worker i’s performance is above the minimum, there
is no benefit to choose a higher performance because
team production is determined by the minimum
performance of the team. This insight helps build the
intuition for Proposition 1. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
Proposition 1. A vector of effort levels y∗ is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium to this game if and only if y∗i  y for all i,
where y∈ [0, ỹ], and ỹ is the solution to cy ( ỹ;θ1)  A.
Proposition 1 indicates that in equilibrium, workers’
performance is determined by the worker with the
lowest ability (or weak-link worker). Although ỹ puts
an upper bound on best-response choices of y∗i , any
team production level such that y∗i ≤ ỹ can be an
equilibrium.
2.3. Coordination Game with a Goal-Dependent
Nonmonetary Utility
We now study the effects of nonmonetary utility. In
particular, we assume that the worker’s payoff func-
tion is given by the combination of monetary and
nonmonetary utilities as well as the cost of effort
πwi (A, y, yi, g)  A ·M (y) + v (yi − g) − c(yi;θi).
As a reminder, team production M(y) is determined
by the lowest performance of all team members, so
M (y)  min (y1, . . . , yn).A worker’s payoff maximi-
zation problem changes so that the first-order con-
dition is characterized by cy (yi;θi) ≤ A + v′ (yi − g).
The left-hand side of this expression represents the
marginal cost, and the right-hand side represents the
marginal utility of effort, which again depends on
team production. Let us define the variables y(θi, g)
and ȳ(θi, g) to be the effort levels that solve a worker’s
maximization problem when he or she is not the weak-
link worker and when he or she is, respectively. In
Proposition 2, we show that in equilibrium, two
groups of workers are formed: low-ability workers
who choose the same effort level as theweak-linkworker
and high-ability workers whose goal-dependent mar-
ginal utility is high enough for them to choose an
effort level above the minimum.
Proposition 2. Let us define L(θ1, g)  {i∈N|y(θi, g) ≤
ȳ(θ1, g)}. A vector of effort levels y∗ is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium if for all i∈ L(θ1, g), y∗i  y and y(θ1, g) ≤
y≤ ȳ(θ1, g). For all i ∉ L(θ1, g), y∗i  y(θi, g).
Proposition 2 indicates that given a goal, there are
potentially two groups of workers in equilibrium. The
first group consists of low-ability workers who choose
the same effort level as the weak-link worker, similar to
the casewith onlymonetary incentives inProposition 1.
This is because low-abilityworkers have amarginal cost
of effort that is high relative to the marginal nonmon-
etary utility, and hence, in equilibrium, their strategies
are affected by the team incentives A. Within this
group, the set of best-response effort choices for all
workers is determined by the ability of the weak-link
worker, just as in the case with onlymonetary payoffs
(Proposition 1). The second group consists of workers
with a sufficiently high ability level who choose a level
of effort that maximizes nonmonetary utility minus the
cost of effort and hence is independent of the team
incentives. For high-ability workers, the marginal cost
of effort relative to the marginal goal-dependent non-
monetary utility is low enough for the workers to be
motivated simply by the nonmonetary incentives de-
rived from goal attainment. In this case, workers’ strat-
egies are independent of other workers’ decisions and
hence different from the case with solely monetary
incentives. Therefore, one consequence of our model
is that whenworkers derive a nonmonetary utility from
their own individual performance, effort levels are ac-
tually less coordinated, because high-ability workers
perform above team production in equilibrium.
To better understand the intuition behind this re-
sult, let us consider a simple example with n  3. On
the one hand, if a worker is producing above the
minimum, i ∉L(θ1, g), his or her optimal level of ef-
fort would be given by y∗i  y(θi, g). On the other hand,
the effort of a worker producing at the minimum,
i∈ L( ȳ, g), is given by y∗i  ȳ(θi, g). It is clear that the
lowest-ability worker will always be in the low-ability
group (i.e., 1 ∈ L(θ1, g)). There may be, however, more
workers in this group. Depending on model param-
eters and y∗, we have three cases:
1. If y(θ2, g)> ȳ(θ1, g), worker θ2 would work more
than the minimum in equilibrium because his or her
effort without monetary motivation is already above
the effort exerted by θ1. This must also be true for θ3
because y(θ3, g)> y(θ2, g). Therefore, in equilibrium,
L(θ1, g)  {1}, and hence y∗1 < y∗2 < y∗3.
2. If y(θ2, g) ≤ ȳ(θ1, g)< y(θ3, g), worker θ2’s optimal
effort when he or she is above the minimumwould be
Fan and Gómez-Miñambres: Nonbinding Goals in Teams
1030 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 1026–1044
lower than y∗1, which means that, in equilibrium, we
must have y∗1  y∗2. Otherwise, worker θ2 can increase
his or her payoff by decreasing effort. Therefore, in
equilibrium, L(θ1, g)  {1, 2}, and hence y∗1  y∗2 < y∗3.
3. Finally, if y(θ3, g) ≤ ȳ(θ1, g), every worker pro-
duces the same in equilibrium, L(θ1, g)  {1, 2, 3}, and
hence y∗1  y∗2  y∗3. This case is equivalent to the stan-
dard case with only monetary motivation.
We now look at the manager’s problem and analyze
how he or she should set the team goal to maximize
team production. To do so, we require an equilibrium
refinement criterion. This is due to the possible multi-
plicity of equilibria in the low-ability group. Therefore,
we make the assumption that when workers in the
low-ability group face multiple equilibria, they choose
an effort level corresponding with the payoff-dominant
equilibrium y∗i  ȳ(θ1, g) for all i∈ L(θ1, g). This effort
level corresponds to the highest effort the weak-link
worker would willingly exert. The payoff dominance
equilibrium refinement implies a unique pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium where
y∗i 
{
ȳ(θ1, g) if i∈ L(θ1, g),
y(θi, g) if i ∉ L(θ1, g) .
We note that determining whether the payoff domi-
nance equilibrium refinement is a reasonable assump-
tion becomes an empirical question. Classic weak-link
coordination experiments with abstract effort rarely
observe the payoff-dominant equilibrium (Van Huyck
et al. 1990, Knez and Camerer 1994, Brandts et al.
2011). In fact, most of these experiments observe out-
comes tending toward the least efficient equilibrium.
However, recent coordination experiments (Vranceanu
et al. 2015, Bortolotti et al. 2016) using real effort find
the opposite: subjects’ individual performance and
coordination outcomes increase over time and ap-
proach the payoff-dominant equilibrium when one
exists. As we show below, our results corroborate the
findings from previous real effort coordination exper-
iments, and we argue that the assumption of payoff
dominance is reasonable in our setting. The intuition
for Proposition 3 would be qualitatively similar under
other equilibrium refinement assumptions such as
the risk dominance in the low-ability group, where
all workers choose y(θ1, g), which corresponds with
the least efficient equilibrium.
In the next proposition, we summarize important
results on how the manager should set his or her goal.
These results will help us build hypotheses for our
experiment.




dg > 0 (< 0) if and only if y∗i > g (< g), and
(b) The optimal goal set by the manager is given by g∗ 
argmaxg ȳ(θ1, g)< y∗1.
Proposition 3(a) states that a worker’s performance
increases with the goal if his or her performance
exceeds the goal (the goal is attainable), whereas the
opposite is true if the worker’s performance does not
exceed the goal (the goal is unattainable). Therefore,
increasing a goal that is too easy for a worker will be
motivating, whereas increasing a goal that is too
difficult for a worker will have a demotivating effect.
Because the manager is concerned only about monetary
payoffs from team production, which is unaffected by
workers’ performance above the minimum, a profit-
maximizing manager focuses on maximizing the
performance of the weak-link worker and hence will
assign the maximum goal that he or she is willing and
able to attain (Proposition 3(b)). Because this goal is
met by the weak-link worker, it will also be attain-
able by higher-ability workers whose production is
at or above y∗1  ȳ(θ1, g∗). Thus, in equilibrium, all
workers of the team will attain the goal assigned by
the manager.
We finish our theory section by discussing another
implication of goals as reference points suggested
by Heath et al. (1999)—namely, that difficult but at-
tainable goals lead performance to “pile up” around
the goal. Piling up follows directly from loss aversion
(property 3 of the value function): loss aversion im-
plies that a worker is substantially more motivated
when just short of a goal than farther away from
meeting the goal. In our environment, piling up in-
dicates that the weak-link worker is just motivated
enough tomeet g∗, but if the goalwere to be any higher,
the weak-link worker’s performance would decrease
substantially, and the size of this reduction would be
positively related to the loss aversion parameter λ.
Note that this also implies that higher and lower goals
than g∗would yield a higher variation in performance.
Thus, the optimal goal would have the lowest spread
of work performance. In the next proposition, we
show that wasted performance (performance above
the weak-link level) is minimized at the optimal goal.
Proposition 4. Let us define Δi (g)  y(θi, g) − ȳ(θ1, g) for
i ∉L(θ1, g); then Δi (g∗)<Δi (g), for all g≠ g∗.
Proposition 4 is a direct implication of piling up.
Goals that are higher than g∗ may boost high-ability
workers’ performance but decrease the weak-link
worker’s performance, generating not only a lower
team production but also higher wasted perfor-
mance. Similarly, goals that are lower than g∗ would
decrease the performance of all workers on the team,
but because of piling up, the decrease in the weak-link
worker’s performance will be more pronounced,
leading again to lower team production and higher
wasted performance.
To sum up, the optimal goal not only maximizes
team production (Proposition 3) but also generates
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the lowest variation in performance among team
members, minimizing wasted work performance
(Proposition 4).
3. Experimental Design
We design our experiment to measure the impact of
nonbinding goals on team outcomes. In Section 3.1,
we discuss the real effort task in the experiment, com-
monly called the slider task. In Section 3.2, we detail the
experimental design and timeline.
3.1. Real Effort Task: Slider Task
We employ the slider task introduced by Gill and
Prowse (2012). The authors describe the task as
consisting
of a single screen displaying a number of sliders. . . .
When the screen containing the effort task is first
displayed to the subject all of the sliders are positioned
at 0. . . . By using the mouse, the subject can position
each slider at any integer location between 0 and 100
inclusive. Each slider can be adjusted and readjusted
an unlimited number of times, and the current position
of each slider is displayed to the right of the slider. The
subject’s “points score” in the task is the number of
sliders positioned at 50 at the end of the allotted time.
(Gill and Prowse 2012, p. 472)
We chose this real effort task for our experiment
because of a number of desirable features, which are
also noted in Gill and Prowse (2012). The task is easy
to understand, requires no previous knowledge to
complete, and is tedious to complete. Therefore, per-
formance in the task is highly correlated with effort
exerted.
3.2. Experimental Procedure
Subjects act as managers or workers on a team to
complete the task at hand. Our experiment consists of
two basic treatments, referred to as the baseline and
the goal treatments. Treatments last for 13 rounds; in
each round, subjects have two minutes to complete
as many slider tasks as possible. In all treatments,
subjects first attempt the real effort task for three
individual rounds to become familiar with the task
and establish a standard of ability. In these individual
rounds, workers’ payoffs are piece rate and deter-
mined by their individual performance. We use these
initial rounds to compute subjects’ ability levels.
In the baseline and goal treatments, players are
randomly assigned to groups of four (one manager
and three workers) and participate in the real effort
weak-link coordination game. In each team round,
workers complete the slider task for two minutes,
after which the team production, the minimum per-
formance among workers, is revealed to the group.
Before the team rounds begin, the performance of
each worker in the third individual round is revealed
to the team. The manager has the option to complete
the task as well, but his or her performance has no
impact on team production, and it is never revealed to
the workers. We allowmanagers to complete the task
in case they want to remind themselves of how dif-
ficult the task may be. This is important because man-
agers need information about the task difficulty to
assign realistic goals. The payoff of all groupmembers
is determined by the minimum performance in each
group. Therefore, every round, all subjects’ monetary
payoffs are identical within each group.
The only difference between the baseline and the
goal-setting treatment is that managers can assign
a nonbinding goal for team production in the goal
treatment, whereas no such an option is available in
the baseline. The groups in the baseline treatment still
have a manager, although managers do not set goals
for the team. Managers are subjects recruited from
workers in a previous session where they get experi-
ence with the slider task.
We conducted all experimental sessions at the Lab-
oratory for Economics, Management and Auctions
(LEMA) at Pennsylvania State University between
January 2015 and October 2017. We ran 24 matching
groups of the baseline treatment and 24 matching
groups of the goal treatment, although two groups of
the goal treatment had to be dropped as a result of
network connectivity issues. Therefore, we have 24
teams in the baseline treatment and 22 teams in the
goal treatment, with a total of 184 subjects in our ex-
periment. Our subject pool consisted of undergradu-
ate students recruited through the automated online
recruitment system. The experiment lasted for 1 hour,
and subjects earned on average $14.78 in the base-
line treatment and $16.41 in the goal treatment.
3.3. Theoretical Predictions
According to the theoretical analysis presented in
Section 2, we have two different predictions for the
individual effort depending on whether workers
have a nonmonetary utility. If workers do not have a
nonmonetary utility, the outcome of the coordination
game would be consistent with Proposition 1, where
effort is symmetric across all n workers in equilib-
rium, and the weak-link worker θ1 sets the upper
bound of equilibrium team production.
Hypothesis 1A. If workers only care about monetary pay-
offs, all workers’ performance converges to a level that is a
best response for the weak-link worker in both treatments.
Under the assumption that workers do not have a
nonmonetary utility to complete the task, workers are
only motivated by monetary incentives. Therefore,
workers will not have incentives to perform above
what is a best response for the weak-link worker, as
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shown in Proposition 1. However, if workers derive
a nonmonetary utility from their individual perfor-
mance that is independent of the team incentives,
the prediction in both treatments could be given
by the equilibria characterized in Proposition 2.
When assigned goals are not present (in the base-
line), the reference point is unobserved and idiosyn-
cratic to each worker. Even though in both treat-
ments workers may derive a nonmonetary utility
from their own performance regardless of team incen-
tives, the extensive goal-setting literature [see Locke
and Latham (2002) for a review] indicates that as-
signed goals foster workers’ motivation relative to
a situation with no goals. Therefore, we can set the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1B. If workers derive a nonmonetary utility
from their own performance,
(a) the average workers’ performance should be higher
than team production in both treatments, and
(b) the average workers’ performance and team pro-
duction should be higher in the goal treatment than in the
baseline.
It also follows from our theory (Proposition 3(a))
that the goal that maximizes a worker’s performance
is the maximum goal that he or she is willing and able
to achieve; consequently, profit-maximizing man-
agers should assign goals that are challenging but
achievable for the weak-link worker because the weak-
link worker’s performance determines team produc-
tion and hence monetary payoffs (Proposition 3(b)).
Hypothesis 2. In the goal-setting treatment, we expect that
(a) Goals that are challenging but achievable maximize
workers’ performance, and
(b) Managers set goals that are challenging but achievable
for the weak-link worker.
Finally, Proposition 4 indicates that the optimal goal
minimizes wasted performance, the difference between
the worker’s performance and team production.
Hypothesis 3. In the goal-setting treatment, we expect that
goals that are challenging but achievable for the weak-link
worker minimize wasted performance in the team.
4. Results
We start the results section in Section 4.1 by looking
at team production and an individual worker’s per-
formance in the baseline and goal treatments. We then
proceed to look at goals set by themanager in Section 4.2
and study the effect of setting reasonably accurate
goals for the weak-link worker, who determines team
production. In Section 4.3, we study the selection of
team goals by managers in more detail. Finally, in
Section 4.4, we analyze the effect of goal setting on the
dispersion of performance among team members and
wasted performance.
In the analysis of the results, we use workers’ third-
round performance (last round of the individual pro-
duction phase) as a measure of ability, which we call
task ability. The average task ability for all workers is
13.97 in the baseline treatment and 13.12 in the goal
treatment; although the average task ability is slightly
higher in the baseline treatment, this difference is not
statistically significant (t = 1.51, p = 0.134). We define
weak-link ability as the lowest ability in each group in
round 3. Our results are qualitatively similar and sta-
tistically significant using several different measures
for worker ability. These include second-round per-
formance and the average or median of the early
rounds’ performance.
4.1. Goal Setting, Team Production, and
Worker Performance
We begin by examining worker performance and
team production in the baseline and goal treatments.
Table 1 provides a summary of average worker per-
formance and team production in the team rounds for
both treatments, as well as the difference between
treatments.
The average worker performance is consistently
above the weak-link worker’s performance in both
treatments. The average effort of all workers in each
group relative to team production is 112.4% in the
goal treatment and 119.2% in the baseline treatment.
This suggests that workers may derive intrinsic utility
from the act ofworking, in linewithHypothesis 1B(a).
Of course, there are alternative explanations for this
result. For example, workers might work rather than
do nothing as a result of lack of alternatives, a com-
mon problem in laboratory experiments known as the
active participation hypothesis. Another possibility is
that the desire not to be the weak-link worker drives
up individual performance. These alternative expla-
nations, however, do not explain why all workers per-
form better when assigned goals are present, which is a
result consistent with Hypothesis 1B(b). When man-
agers set goals for the team, team production is, on
average, 19.8% higher than with the baseline treat-
ment. This difference is statistically significant under
both the Wilcoxon rank-sum (p < 0.01, z = −3.56) and
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (p < 0.01) tests.
In Figure 1, we report team production and
workers’ performance over the 10 rounds in both
Table 1. Average Worker Performance and Team
Production in Team Rounds
Treatment Worker Performance Team Production
Baseline 12.48 10.47
Goal 14.1 12.55
Difference (Goal − Baseline) 1.62 2.08
Difference (%) 13.0 19.8
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treatments. We see not only that are team production
andworker performance above the minimum level of 0
but also that they increase over time in both treatments.
We present a paneled ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression estimate of the effect of goal setting on
team production at the group level in Table 2. We find
that team production is significantly higher in the goal
treatment at the 0.1% level when controlling for weak-
link ability. This implies that the difference in team
production can be attributed to the goal treatment and
not differences in individual workers between treat-
ments. From these results, we conclude that goal set-
ting has a significant positive effect on aggregate team
production, which is consistent withHypothesis 1B(b).
We also see that the time trend is always statistically
significant and positive for team production: team
production is increasing over time for both treatments.
Although this finding is unlike previous weak-link ex-
periments with abstract effort, our result is in line with
other real effort coordination experiments (Vranceanu
et al. 2015, Bortolotti et al. 2016). We take a closer look
at what goals managers set in the next section.
Result 1 (Workers’ Performance and Team Production).
Workers’ performance and team production are sig-
nificantly greater in the goal treatment than in the
baseline treatment, in line with Hypothesis 1B.
4.2. Goal Accuracy for the Weak-Link Worker and
Team Production
We now study the effect of goal accuracy in the per-
formance of the weak-link worker, which determines
team production and hence monetary payoffs. The
weak-linkworker is fairly consistentwithin each group;
76% of the time, it is the same worker who determines
team production. From our theory, we predict that
setting the maximum goal the weak-link worker would
attain in equilibrium maximizes his or her individual per-
formance and hence team production (Hypothesis 2(a)).
In Figure 2, we plot the average team production
and average goal set by the manager. On initial in-
spection, managers appear to be setting goals that are
too challenging for the weak-link worker; the average
goal is 16.6, which is 4.1 units higher than the average
team production. The average goal is so challenging
that there are only 79 rounds out of the possible 220
where the team production meets or exceeds the goal.
This result appears to be inconsistent with our theo-
retical conjectures.
One possible interpretation of this result is that
managers set goals that are, on average, unattainable
by weak-link workers because, in contrast to our the-
oretical framework, they find these goals to be most
effective. To test the effectiveness of manager’s goal-
setting decisions, we need to identify reasonably
accurate goals in the sense of being attainable yet
Figure 1. (Color online) Average Team Production and Workers’ Performance in Both Treatments
Table 2. Paneled OLS Regression on Team Production at













Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
aDummy variable.
**p < 0.05; ****p < 0.001.
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challenging for the weak-link worker. Similar to
Corgnet et al. (2015), we start by using the weak-link
ability, the weak-link worker’s output in round 3, to
establish a basis for what goals are reasonable. How-
ever, in our team rounds with strategic complemen-
tarity, weak-link ability alone is not a good predictor
of team production, and defining a goal as reasonable
based on this predictor yields no insight. Therefore,
using data from the baseline treatment, we estimate
task ability in the current round as follows:
Predicted task abilityt  α̂1 × lagged team production + α̂2
× double lagged team production,
where α̂1 and α̂2 are estimated from the baseline
treatment data with the following feasible generalized
least squares linear panel regression with no constant:
Team productiont α1 × lagged production + α2
× double lagged production + εt.
The linear panel feasible generalized least squaresmodel
allows us to suppress the constant while estimating the
weighted coefficients of lagged dependent variables,
unlike generalized method of moments (GMM) dy-
namic panels. We obtain α̂1  0.61 and α̂2  0.39, in-
dicating that for the predicted task ability for a given
round, 61% of the weight is placed on last round’s
team production and 39% of the weight is placed on
team production from two rounds ago.
On the basis of the predicted task ability, we define
the variable Reasonable Goal as a dummy that takes a
value of 1 if the goal lies within a range of two units of
predicted task ability, defined earlier as the weighted
average of the team production from two previous
rounds. We chose a range of 2 for our definition based
on the standard deviation of team productions, which
is 2.56 in the goal treatment and 2.68 in the base-
line treatment. We observe reasonable goals for the
weak-link worker in 117 of the 220 rounds, which is
53.2% of the rounds. Figure 3 shows the distribution
of all goals minus predicted task ability (the red bars
represent reasonable goals).
Next, we separate workers into two groups, weak-
link workers and other (higher-ability) workers. As
we indicated earlier, team production (i.e., perfor-
mance of the weak link) is higher when goals are
reasonable. In particular,weak-linkworkers on average
complete 12.08 units when the goal is not reasonable
and 13.0 units when the goal is reasonable for them. This
difference is statistically significant as the session level
under the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.01). Con-
versely, the two other workers in the group complete
17.7 units when the goal is not reasonable for the weak-
link worker and 17.9 units when the goal is reasonable
for the weak-link worker. This difference is not statis-
tically significant (p = 0.24). In Figure 4, we report the
aggregate effect of reasonable goals on team pro-
duction. As noted in Section 4.1, team production is
2.08 units higher in the goal treatment comparedwith
the baseline treatment, which is an increase of 19%.
When we look at reasonable goals compared with
unreasonable goals, we see an even clearer picture:
aggregate team production under reasonable goals
is 13.0, an increase of 24% compared with the base-
line treatment. On the contrary, team production
under unreasonable goals for the weak-link worker
is 12.08, which is only a 15% increase between the base-
line and goal treatments. Therefore, we find empirical
evidence that setting a reasonable goal for theweak-link
worker is important to team success. Managers who
set reasonable goals for theweak-linkworker increase
Figure 2. (Color online) Goals vs. Team Production
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monetary payoffs for their teams by almost 25%,
whereas managers who set unreasonable goals ob-
serve much smaller gains to team production.
Although setting reasonable goals for the weak-
link worker theoretically (Hypothesis 2(b)) and em-
pirically increases team production, we still find that
almost half the managers in our sample seem to assign
goals according to different criteria, which prevents
them from fully capitalizing on the monetary gains of
goal-setting policies. We study the manager’s goal
selection in more detail in the next section, where we
propose a possible interpretation of these results.
Result 2 (Goal Accuracy and Team Production). Man-
agers set reasonable goals for the weak-link worker
in 53.2% of the rounds, so empirical support for Hy-
pothesis 2(b) is ambiguous. Reasonable goals improve
aggregate team production by 24% compared with
the baseline treatment. Unreasonable goals have a
smaller effect. This is clear empirical support for
Hypothesis 2(a).
4.3. Managers’ Goal Selection
We saw in the preceding section that some managers
in our experiment are not setting the goals that
maximize team production. Of the 103 observations
of unreasonable goals, 87 are goals that are above
actual team production; 23 of these goals are at least
10 units above actual team production. These man-
agers may believe that setting increasingly difficult and
Figure 3. (Color online) Distribution of Goals—Predicted Task Ability (Reasonable Goals in Red)
Figure 4. (Color online) Reasonable vs. Unreasonable Goals for the Weak-Link Worker and Team Production
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unattainable goals will motivate the weak-link worker to
improve performance, contrary to our theory and em-
pirical evidence, or they may be setting goals for reasons
different from profit maximization. In Table 3, we
present two linear dynamic panel-data models on
goals at the group level when they are unreasonable
and when they are reasonable (we use the Arellano–
Bover/Blundell–Bond generalized method of mo-
ments system estimator to avoid endogeneity bias that
may arise in paneled OLS estimations with lagged
dependent and independent variables). In particular,
reasonable goals are correlated with team production
in the previous round, whereas unreasonable goals are
not. The result suggests that managers who set rea-
sonable goals for the weak link update goals based on
feedback from previous team production. However,
managers assigning unreasonable goals do not seem to
consider team production at all. In other words, only
managers who set reasonable goals seem to focus on
the weak link’s previous performance, which our
theory and empirical evidence suggest is the optimal
way of assigning goals.
We also see that the time trend is marginally sta-
tistically significant and positive for unreasonable
goals, indicating that these managers are setting in-
creasingly difficult goals over time, even thoughmost
team productions are far below these goals. If all
managers were learning to set more motivating goals
over time, we would see the difference between goals
and team productions shrinking over time. Instead,
unreasonable goals become increasingly difficult and
unrealistic compared with team production. Finally,
we look at the correlation between goals and the
ability of the most productive worker, which we call
High Task Ability. This variable measures the third-
round performance of the most productive worker
on the team, similar to weak-link ability. For goals
that are unreasonable, the most productive worker’s
ability ismarginally correlatedwith the goal, whereas
team production is not. This evidence suggests that
some managers are setting goals that are appropriate
for the best workers of the team, but these goals are
too difficult for the weak link. This failure to adapt
goal-setting strategy in a team production environ-
ment lowers profits for all team members. In Table A.1
in the appendix, we consider an alternative model
specification where we categorize managers as rea-
sonable managers if they set seven or more reasonable
goals out of the 10 team rounds. Similar to the results
in Table 3, we observe that reasonable managers set
goals correlated with team production in the previ-
ous round, whereas unreasonable managers do not.
Unreasonable managers set goals correlated with
high task ability.
Our results are in line with other economic, psy-
chology, andmanagement science studies, which find
that some managers are reluctant to adapt their strat-
egies to feedback on workers’ characteristics. For ex-
ample, using data from a company that provide online
job testing services, Hoffman et al. (2018) study the
effects of job testing on managerial hiring decisions
and performance. The authors found that human re-
sourcemanagerswho frequently use their discretion to
override the results of a proprietary skills test hired
workers who performed worse than workers hired by
other managers. Similarly, in a laboratory experiment,
Corgnet and Hernán González (2014) report evidence
that consulting workers was beneficial to managers as
long as they follow the workers’ advice; nevertheless,
most managers were reluctant to change their mind
and adopt the workers’ proposal. Thus, most man-
agers ignore proposals in favor of their original plan
despite the monetary costs. This rigidity of mind may
arise because people focus too much on their own
beliefs instead of adapting their strategies to some-
body else’s feedback. In other words, managers may
suffer from the well-documented self-serving bias
(Loewenstein et al. 1993, Babcock et al. 1996, Babcock
and Loewenstein 1997). In linewith this idea, someman-
agers in our experiment may believe that all workers
should achieve the performancedictated by the highest-
ability workers without paying proper attention to the
negative motivational effects of setting too challeng-
ing goals for weak-link workers. When these workers
fail to reach the goal, some managers ignore this feed-
back and do not adjust their strategy even when it
is in theirmaterial interest to do so. The observation that
some managers misunderstand or ignore feedback is
common in the operations and management litera-
ture as well. For example, Sterman (1989) finds that
human subjects experience several “misperceptions
Table 3. GMM Linear Dynamic Panel Data Model on Goals






Lagged Goal 0.224 0.0185
(0.222) (0.0663)
Lagged Production −0.116 0.319***
(0.349) (0.0921)
Weak-link Ability −1.103 0.273
(2.080) (0.450)
High Task Ability 1.776* 0.0637
(0.859) (0.223)







Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10; ***p < 0.01.
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of feedback” in a multitier inventory distribution sys-
tem with time delay, commonly known as the beer game.
The misperceptions of feedback result in the bull-
whip effect, and Chen et al. (2000) demonstrate that
the behavioral phenomenon does not disappear even
with centralized demand information.
Result 3 (Managerial Goal Selection). Although 53.2%of
the time managers set reasonable goals, some man-
agers persistently set unreasonable goals that increase
in difficulty over time. This finding is contrary to Hy-
pothesis 2(b) and suggests that some managers have
alternative strategies on how to set goals—strategies
that are suboptimal from the point of view of profit
maximization.
4.4. Dispersion of Workers Performance and
Wasted Performance
Finally, we look at the dispersion of workers’ per-
formance within each treatment. Table 4 summarizes
the mean and standard deviation of all workers’ per-
formance, as well as the mean and standard devia-
tion of weak-link workers’ performance versus other
workers, and the test of equality of standard devia-
tions statistics between the baseline and goal treat-
ments, both at the session level. We see that there is
greater dispersion of performance when goals are
present. This empirically suggests that, on average,
goals set by managers act as a motivation device
rather than a coordination device. Thus, goals in-
crease all workers performance, but they also dis-
perse individual worker performance.
To understand why goals increase the standard
deviation of workers performance, we introduce the
variable Wasted Performance, which we define as a
worker’s performance above the weak-link worker’s
level. As we explained in Section 4.1, we chose the
label wasted because performance levels above the
minimum do not result in monetary earnings. Our
theory suggests that because of piling up, wasted
performance is minimized when goals are challeng-
ing but attainable for the weak-link worker. Table 5
presents results from a Z-test of equality of means,
clustered by session, for wasted performance from
the other two higher-ability workers, because, by
definition, the weak-linkworker wasted performance
is 0. We note that there is no statistical difference in
wasted performance between the baseline and goal
treatments. However, when we analyze wasted perfor-
mance in the goal treatment and separate observations
by when there is an unreasonable versus reason-
able goal, we find that wasted performance is signifi-
cantly higher at the session level when workers face
an unreasonable goal. This finding is consistent with
Hypothesis 3: reasonable goals that are challenging
but attainable for the weak-link worker minimize
wasted performance and hence decrease the stan-
dard deviation of performance.
Result 4 (Wasted Performance). The standard de-
viation of workers’ performance is higher when goals
are present. We show that this is because unreason-
able goals significantly increase wasted performance.
However, reasonable goals significantly decrease
wasted performance and hence the spread of perfor-
mance among workers in the team. These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 3.
5. Discussion
In this study, we test the efficacy of nonbinding goals
in teams where production depends on the weak-link
worker. To do so, we model team production as a real
effort weak-link coordination game among workers,
where managers can set a goal for the team. We find
that nonbinding goals are effective motivators for
teams in our experiment. In particular, aggregate
team production increases by 19.8% when goals are
present, and this positive effect is more pronounced
when the goal is reasonable for the weak-link worker.
The positive effect of goals on teams’ production
holds evenwhen controlling formeasures of workers’
individual ability within groups. We also find that
in the absence of goals, team production does not fall
to the worst possible outcome of zero. This finding
differs from the large body of literature on abstract
effort minimum coordination games, where conver-
gence to the least efficient equilibrium is the norm, but
is consistent with other real effort experiments.
Table 4. Test of Equality of Standard Deviations for Workers’ Performance at the
Group Level
Workers Treatment N Mean Std. dev. F-test
All workers Baseline 122 13.27 3.05 p = 0.02
Goal 114 15.02 3.72 Reject
Weak-link workers (Team outcome) Baseline 54 11.06 2.00 p = 0.11
Goal 52 12.57 2.39 Fail to reject
Other workers Baseline 68 15.55 2.57 p = 0.01
Goal 62 17.74 3.39 Reject
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Our paper shows that workers on teams respond
to nonmonetary incentives such as goal setting. Us-
ing nonbinding managerial goals in organizations is
particularly appealing because these goals are easy
and costless to implement. Furthermore, these goals
can significantly increase team production while also
avoiding conflicts of interest betweenmanagement and
workers. When a goal is binding, the firm or manager
must pay the monetary incentive when the goal is met;
this can lead the firm or manager to set goals that do
not maximize team production. Nonbinding goals can
align the incentives of both parties.
Our results also indicate that not all goals are equally
effective. In particular, we find that setting unrealistic
team goals (goals that are too difficult for the weak-link
worker) is much less effective than setting reason-
able goals. Unfortunately, almost half of the time, our
managers set goals that are too difficult, and this effect
is persistent. We argue that this important result is
consistent with similar findings in the literature on self-
serving biases. Our results suggest that it would be
beneficial to train managers to overcome their rigidity
of mind when setting goals for others. Through train-
ing, organizations can teach managers to overcome
personal idiosyncrasies and assign better goals for their
teams. When managers are able to empathize with their
weak-link workers and use available information to set
challenging yet achievable goals for them, teams as
well as managers benefit. Moreover, our finding that
suboptimal goals also increase wasted performance
suggests that improving goal-setting strategies is es-
pecially important in production settings where over-
performance is costly for the firm (scrap, energy use, in-
ventory costs, lowerprices as a result of oversupply, etc.).
Our findings suggest several interesting lines for
future research. First, the result that some managers
are unsuccessful at setting optimal goals even when
the necessary information is at their disposal moti-
vates the question of how to minimize the impact of
managerial mistakes or biases in setting team goals.
Firms may adopt policies to improve managers’ goal-
setting behavior, such as increasing feedback about
goals that are challenging but attainable for the weak
link. Moreover, it would be interesting to delve more
into the role that managerial leadership has on goal
effectiveness in teams. In our experiment, we focus on
a vertical leadership environment in which managers
are always in charge of goal setting; however, onemight
imagine that workers might be more committed to
attain team goals when they participate in setting them
(horizontal leadership) or when the manager simply
asks for the workers’ opinion before assigning the
goals (consultative leadership). Different leadership
structures may moderate the impact of nonbinding
goals and intrinsic motivation on worker performance
and team production. From a theoretical standpoint,
our model could be generalized to consider random-
ness in workers’ production, which would lead to a
more complex probability distribution over outcomes
and hence additional coordination problems. Finally,
it is worth exploring the impact of binding goals on
teams with diverse production technologies. Bind-
ing goals such as sales quotas and project deadlines
directly affect a worker’s monetary incentives, and
these goals are commonplace as well. Whether man-
agers set optimal binding goals and what impact these
goals have on team production remain important open
questions.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that yi  y−i with 0≤ yi ≤ ỹ is a Nash equi-
librium. Suppose that yi  y∗ for all i and 0≤ y≤ ỹ. Now
suppose that worker i chooses yi > y. Worker i’s payoff is
given by πwi (yi, y−i) A ·M(y) − c(yi;θi)<A ·M(y)− c(y;θi) 
πwi (y∗). This is because c( ·) is increasing in y for all workers.
Therefore, worker i has no incentive to increase effort above y∗.
Now consider any yi < y. In other words, worker i uni-
laterally sets the minimum. By assumption, 0≤ y≤ ỹ, and in
this range πw (yi, y−i) < πw (y, y−i). This is to say, in this
range, the monetary payoff from a higher team production
level outweighs the increased cost of effort for all workers.
Therefore, a worker has no incentive to decrease effort.
Now we show that any Nash equilibrium to this game
satisfies yi  y−i with 0≤ yi ≤ ỹ. Suppose that y∗ is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. First assume that y∗ is not a
constant vector. Then there exists yi >M(y) for some i, so
worker i can increase profits by setting yi  M(y). Doing so
will decrease his or her cost of effort without decreasing his
or her monetary payoffs. Now assume that y∗ > ỹ. For any
worker with ability parameter θ1, his or her profit function
is decreasing in this range. He or she can increase profits by
choosing yi < y∗. □
Proof of Proposition 2
Following Wu et al. (2008), we consider a special case of
optimization referred to as myopic optimization. We require
Table 5. Z-Test of Equality of Means for Wasted
Performance at the Group Level
Treatment N Clusters Mean t-Test
Baseline 456 24 5.19 p = 0.57
Goal 416 22 5.26 Fail to reject
Unreasonable goal 198 22 5.46 p = 0.03
Reasonable goal 218 21 5.09 Reject
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this assumption because solutions of the optimization
problem with a prospect theory value function are not
necessarily unique. □
Assumption A.1 (Myopic Optimization). The worker stops
performing when the marginal cost of obtaining an additional unit
first exceeds the marginal benefit of obtaining that unit. Thus, the
optimal performance is given by y∗  min{y1, . . . , yn}, where
y1, . . . , yn are solutions to v′ (y − g)  cy (y;θ).
In essence, Assumption A.1 guarantees that the solution
will be the minimum performance of all possible equilibria.
Thus, without this assumption, the optimal work perfor-
mance that we compute below could be higher, but none of
our qualitative results, in particular the relationship be-
tween work performance and goal setting, would change.
To prove Proposition 2, we established the following
lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let Assumption A.1 hold. Then v′′ (y∗ − g)<
cyy (y∗;θ).
Proof of Lemma 1. Because y∗ is the profit-maximizing per-
formance given goal g, v′ (y∗ − g)  cy (y∗;θ). Because v( · )
is concave for gains and c( · ) is convex, Assumption A.1 implies
v′ (y∗− g − ε)> cy (y∗ − ε;θ). Therefore, v′′ (y∗ − g)< cyy (y∗;θ).
Note that Lemma A.1 ensures that second-order condition
for the performance that maximizes worker’s overall utility
πw( · )  A ·M(y) + v(yi − g) − c(yi;θi) holds.
Let us consider θ∈ [θ1,θn]. A worker with ability θ pro-
ducing above the minimum is not affected by monetary
incentives, and his or her best-response effort choice is
characterized by
y(θ, g)  {y : v′ (y − g)  cy (y;θ)}. (A.1)
Alternatively, a worker producing at the minimum is af-
fected by monetary incentives, and his or her best-response
effort choice is given by
ȳ(θ, g)  {y :A + v′ (y − g)  cy (y;θ)}. (A.2)
Note that for A> 0, y(θ, g)< ȳ(θ, g) for all workers. We
first prove that both ȳ( · ) and y( · ) increase in θ for a given g.
Note that by differentiating ȳ(θ, g) or y(θ, g) with respect
to θ and using the implicit function theorem, we get
v′′ (y − g) dy
dθ
 cyy (y;θ) dydθ + cyθ (y;θ),





v′′ (y − g) − cyy (y;θ).
The denominator of this expression is negative because of
Lemma A.1, whereas the numerator is negative by the prop-
erties of c( · ). Hence, dydθ> 0, and both ȳ( · ) and y( · ) increase
in θ for a given g.
Now, for a given g≥ 0, let us define the threshold abil-
ity level θ̃(θ1) as y(θ̃(θ1) , g)  ȳ(θ1, g). Note that because
both y( · ) and ȳ( · ) increase in θ, θ≥ θ̃(θ1) if and only if
ȳ(θ1, g) ≤ y(θ, g). Therefore, we can define the low-ability
workers group as L(θ1, g)  {i ∈N|y(θi, g) ≤ ȳ(θ1, g)}, which
has cardinality of at least 1; thus, θ1 will always be in this
group. If |L(θ1, g)|  1, worker θ1 is the only low-ability
worker, and his or her best-response effort level is the so-
lution to A + v′ (y − g)  cy (y;θ1). This is a unique pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium.
If |L(θ1, g)| ≥ 2 then, applying the logic of Proposition 1, we
see that for all i∈ L(θ1, g), yi  y∗, where y(θ1, g) ≤ y∗ ≤ ȳ(θ1, g).
Finally, for all i ∉ L(θ1, g), it holds that y(θi, g)> ȳ(θ1, g).
Hence, in equilibrium, these workers’ best-response ef-
fort levels are not affected by monetary team incentives, and
yi  ȳ(θi, g)  {y : v′ (y − g)  cy (y;θi)} is a pure strategyNash
equilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove Proposition 3, we assume a widely accepted
equilibrium refinement criterion that states that when
workers in the low-ability group face multiple equilibria in
the coordination game, they choose an effort level corre-
sponding to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. □
Assumption A.2 (Payoff Dominance). Low-ability workers
with ability parameters θ1, . . . ,θm choose the symmetric best-
response effort level that yields the payoff-dominant equilibrium
in the coordination game. In our context, the effort level is the
solution to A + v′ (y − g)  cy (y;θ1). This effort level is the
maximum effort the weak-link worker would willingly exert.
Given Assumption A.2, there is a unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in this game, where low-ability workers
exert effort yi  ȳ(θ1, g)  {y :A + v′ (y − g)  cy (y;θ1)} and
high-ability workers exert effort yi  y(θi,g)  {y :v′ (y−g) 
cy (y;θi)}.
The proof of Proposition 3(a) is based on the Wu et al.
(2008) analysis of a goal-dependent prospect theory value
function with exogenously given goals. This result is sim-
ilar to proposition 1 in Wu et al. (2008).
Given Proposition 2 and Assumption A.2, the optimal
production is given by
y∗i 
{
ȳ(θ1, g) if i ∈L( ȳ, g),
y(θi, g) if i ∉ L( ȳ, g) .
Let us start by showing how goals affect the effort of
workers in the high-ability group (i ∉ L(θ1, g)). Given a goal,
the optimal performance for high-ability workers is char-
acterized by Equation (A.1):
v′ (y(θ, g) − g)  cy (y(θ, g);θ).
Using the implicit function theorem and differentiating














′′ (y(θ, g) − g)
v′′ (y(θ, g) − g) − cyy (y(θ, g);θ).
The denominator of this expression must be negative at
the optimal performance level because it is the second-order




′′ (y(θ, g) − g) must have
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opposite signs. Moreover, note that by properties 4 and 5 of
v(y − g), we know that v′′ (y(θ, g) − g)> 0(< 0) if and only if
y(θ, g)< g (> g). This means that higher goals improve the
performanceof a high-abilityworker, if his or her performance
exceeds the goals (the goal is attainable for him or her) but
decreases performance if his or her performance does not
exceed the goal (the goal is not attainable for himor her). Thus,
dy(θ, g)
dg > 0 (< 0) if and only if y(θ, g)> g (< g).
Similarly, given a goal, the optimal performance for
workers in the low-ability group (i∈L(θ1, g)) is given by
Equation (A.2):
A + v′ ( ȳ(θ1, g) − g) − cy ( ȳ(θ1, g);θ1).
By deriving both sides of this expression with respect
to g, we get











′′ ( ȳ(θ1, g) − g)
v′′ ( ȳ(θ1, g) − g) − cyy ( ȳ(θ1, g);θ1).
Using the same argument, dȳ(θ1, g)dg > 0 (< 0) if and only if
ȳ(θ1, g)> g (< g).
We now proceed to prove Proposition 3(b). Note that a
profit-maximizing manager should focus on maximizing the
performanceof theweak-linkworker, theonlyonedetermining
the team’s production. In Proposition 3(a), we showed that
Figure A.1. (Color online) Plot of ĝ and ŷ
Figure A.2. (Color online) Plot of g∗ and ȳ(θ1, g∗)
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this goal corresponds to the maximum goal that the weak-link
worker is willing and able to attain (i.e., g∗  argmaxg ȳ(θ1, g)).
To compute g∗, we start by defining ĝ as the minimum
goal that the weak-link worker would fail to attain and ŷ as
its corresponding performance (see Figure A.1).
From Equation (A.2), we know that
A + v′ ( ŷ − ĝ)  cy ( ŷ;θ1).
By deriving both sides of this equation with respect to ŷ,
we get
v′′ ( ŷ − ĝ)  cyy ( ŷ;θ1).
We can compute ĝ and ŷ by solving the following system
of equations:
v′′ ( ŷ − ĝ)  cyy ( ŷ;θ1),
v′ ( ŷ − ĝ)  cy ( ŷ;θ1).
Finally, note that because ĝ is the minimum goal that the
weak-link worker would fail to attain, the maximum goal
that he or she could attain is slightly lower. Thus, g∗  ĝ − ε
with ε→ 0, as shown in Figure A.2. □
Proof of Proposition 4
This proof is based on the proof of proposition 5 in Wu et al.
(2008). First, we formalize the notion of piling up. Let us call
G(δ;θ,λ) the set of goals in which performance exceeds a
particular goal by δ or less. Thus, if g ∈G(δ;θ,λ), then
0≤ yi − g≤ δ. □
To check how piling up is related to loss aversion in our
environment, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.2 (Piling Up). There exists a sufficiently high
level of loss aversion λ> 1 such that if g∈G(δ;θi, 1), then g∈
G(δ;θ1,λ), where i ∉ L(θ1, g).
Proof of Lemma A.2. If g ∈G(δ;θ1, 1), Lemma A.2 clearly
holds. Thus, we must consider the case in which g∈G(δ;θi, 1)
and g ∉G(δ;θ1, 1). The latter implies that the goal g that is
attained by worker i is not attained by the weak link. Thus,
Figure A.3. (Color online)Wasted Performance of the Highest-AbilityWorker Under the Optimal Goal (Left-Hand Side) and a
Higher Goal (Right-Hand Side)
Figure A.4. (Color online)Wasted Performance of the Highest-AbilityWorker Under the Optimal Goal (Left-Hand Side) and a
Lower Goal (Right-Hand Side)
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for some y1 < g, A − v′ (g − y1)  cy (y1;θ1). Hence, because
v′ (g − y1)< 0, for λ> 1, A − λv′ (g − y1)> cy (y1;θ1). There-
fore, when λ> 1, the production of the weak link y1 is
higher than when λ  1; for a sufficiently high λ, it must be
the case that y1 > g, so A + v′ (y1 − g)  cy (y1;θ1).
Lemma A.2 indicates that a loss-averse weak-link
worker is willing to just attain a goal that a higher-
ability worker without loss aversion also attains, as long as
loss aversion is sufficiently high.
Proposition 4 is a direct consequence of this result (piling
up). When workers are below their goals, they receive high
benefits from removing a “loss,” and these incentives in-
crease with the level of loss aversion. However, once they
reach their goal and enter the domain of gains, the marginal
benefits of additional performance will be substantially
smaller. The optimal goal that we described in Proposi-
tion 3(b), g∗, is themaximumgoal that the weak-linkworker
is willing and able to attain; given this goal, the weak-link
worker exceeds the goal by a small margin (see Figure A.2).
However, if the goal is any higher—ĝ  g∗ + ε for an arbi-
trarily small ε—his or her performance would be sub-
stantially lower (see Figure A.1), increasing the difference
in performance between high-ability workers and the weak
link (wasted performance) Δi (g). To illustrate, consider an
examplewhere n  3 and L(θ1, g)  {1}. Thus, there are three
workers: the weak link and two higher-ability workers
who produce above the weak link’s level in equilibrium.
Figure A.3 shows the case in which the goal is higher than
the optimal goal gH > g∗. In this case, the weak-link worker
does not meet the goal gH, and the wasted performance of
the highest-ability worker is higher than with the optimal
goal Δ3 (gH)>Δ3 (g∗). Similarly, when the goal is less than
gL < g∗, all workers exceed the goal by a generous margin,
but just as in the high-goals case, wasted performance is
higher than under optimal goals (see Figure A.4). Therefore,
low and high goals yield the highest wasted performance
of high-ability workers, whereas the optimal goal induces
the lowest dispersion. □
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